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One of the many interesting aspects of studying the division of domestic labor is 
the strong, even visceral, reactions people have to the topic (and to our theoretical 
conceptualization of it).  Sometimes we feel like the poor benighted fool who introduces 
politics at the family Thanksgiving dinner only to discover that everyone has an opinion, 
feels strongly about that opinion and is unerringly convinced that her/his position is 
incontrovertibly the right one. Having a dispassionate conversation regarding domestic 
labor can be quite difficult, but we believe it is essential that we do so and is one reason 
we developed our integrated theory. 
 Like our reviewers, we became engaged in the conversation on the division of 
domestic labor due to strongly held beliefs about fairness, justice, sex roles, and 
relationships as well as, especially for us, concern about the high levels of conflict that 
attend the performance of and conversations about domestic labor. Once so engaged, we 
attempted to develop a theory that removes some of the emotionality from the study of 
domestic labor in the hopes of making it easier to talk about and resolve disparities, as 
well as improve relationships. In some ways we believe we have succeeded, and in others 
perhaps not, as our reviewers’ comments suggest. 
Those comments, as well as those of Editor Caryn Medved and an anonymous 
reviewer, have provided and continue to provide us with ways to sharpen our ideas and 
their presentation as we move forward. Our reading of the most recent critiques presented 
in this volume have lead us to recognize which of our ideas and positions need additional 
clarification, to identify ideas that we will consider as we research and revise our theory, 
and to question how the insights offered help people talk about and negotiate domestic 
labor right now. Although we cannot respond to all of the comments that sparked our 
reactions or the totality of the critiques offered by Professors Wood and Clair, we would 
like to respond to a few central arguments they presented.  
Perhaps the critique that sparked the strongest response in us and which we felt 
most misrepresented our perspective on the division of labor was the claim by Professor 
Wood that we were establishing a ruler and that the ruler was a female one.  We would 
like to take up both of these issues. First, we do not believe we are setting up a ruler or 
standard for the appropriate performance of domestic labor.  We conceptualize threshold 
level as an individual characteristic that varies widely and that becomes contested only 
when two individuals with disparate threshold levels live together.  This does not 
necessarily mean that one person is very neat, clean, and tidy and that the other is not; in 
fact, both people objectively could be quite clean or quite messy and dirty.  Problems 
related to the division of domestic labor arise, we argue, because there is a discrepancy 
between dyadic members’ thresholds and that one becomes an over-performer or under-
performer only in relation to one’s partner – not in relation to an objective standard.  
Thus, the person with the lowest threshold level in a dyad of two people with very high 
thresholds likely still will become an over-performer in comparison to his or her partner.  
In sum, we argue that what Professor Wood describes as a “ruler” is not ours to create but 
rather is specific to each dyad and typically established by the partner with the lowest 
threshold level, which leads us to her second issue, that the ruler is female in its 
orientation. 
Although we certainly make the case that women in heterosexual dyads often bear 
the burden of being over-performers and many may in fact possess lower threshold 
levels, perhaps in as many as a third of heterosexual cohabiting couples the male partner 
has a lower threshold and potentially is the over-performer (Chethik, 2006). Our theory 
includes sex and gender as contributing to discrepancies in performance for two reasons: 
women may be disposed to having lower threshold levels and to having been socialized 
to have greater competencies; but fundamentally the issue is an individual one. And 
again, the ruler likely is created by whichever partner has the lower tolerance for dirt and 
disorder, be it a woman or a man. 
Relatedly, Professor Wood suggests that our theory is biased toward the over-
performer’s rule or standard. Although we disagree, we believe she makes a legitimate 
argument that this not sufficiently clear until the end of the paper. We do not think the 
over-performer’s standards are those that must be met by both members of the dyad, but 
we recognize that threshold level is a driver of behavior and can feel quite compelling. 
Thus, a lower threshold drives an individual to over-perform and consequently to feel 
overworked and underappreciated as well disadvantaged professionally, interpersonally, 
and personally. Such behavior creates an imbalance within the dyad because the under-
performing partner’s threshold is rarely met, and in turn she/he benefits in a variety of 
ways from being paired with a lower threshold partner, a situation that could turn on a 
dime if she or he were paired with a different partner. In sum, we see the problems 
created by discrepancies in threshold level and subsequent performance as a distinctly 
dyadic one which requires a dyadic response. 
Our response to Professor Clair’s critique is somewhat different. We absolutely 
agree that “a rhetorical theory of domestic labor . . . is not necessarily antithetical to the 
integrative theory . . . rather it may provide a supporting communication-oriented 
explanation for the continuing troublesome meanings and messages that far too often 
arise surrounding the division of labor (domestic and otherwise)” (p. 2).  Where we 
diverge is in the desire for our theories to offer insight versus redress. Clair’s perspective 
allows for critique and analysis of potential interpretations but is less focused on 
providing a framework to assess the basis for those narratives and couples’ behaviors, nor 
does it specify how to improve choices and communication between relational partners 
over this contentious issue.  While a narrative approach provides a way to understand 
couples’ interpretations of their experience, we believe a distinct value of our integrative 
theory is in helping to explain behavior. People very often use narrative constructions to 
justify behaviors, but that doesn’t mean those narratives always reflect what they do or 
why they do it.  Our theory, however, can shed light on behaviors (and their causes) in a 
way that illuminates individual and dyadic choices with the goal of helping couples 
develop interactional patterns and interpretive structures that assist them in resolving 
conflicts over the division of domestic labor. Despite these differences, we see great 
value in tying our insights back to narrative constructions, because both influence how 
people understand and respond to their own and others’ lives and choices.  
In addition, Clair usefully points out how narrative stories play a role in conflict. 
Namely, when dyads approach the same issue with a different rhetorical construction 
(e.g., “dusting is not a job I own,” versus “when he doesn’t dust, he is saying he doesn’t 
care”) there is bound to be conflict. Clair suggests that if couples shared the same 
narrative, there would not be as much conflict and illustrates this argument by 
rhetorically analyzing Noah’s comment: 
Hang on a minute.  I never asked her to do anything of those things. 
 I can’t help it if she has higher standards than I do.  I don’t care what  
we have for dinner. I don’t care if the floor gets mopped twice a week. 
She argues that in saying this, the man shows that he does not desire any part of this 
“Martha Stewart-esque” rhetorical construction of who they are as a couple. We certainly 
concur that relational conflict and resentment occur because of a mismatch in stories. 
However, we would like to point out something that she glosses: Namely, one story has 
much more power than another. Because domestic labor has traditionally been the 
province of women, its narrative has less credence and more justification is necessary for 
it. Indeed, as Clair points out, Durkheim even linked domestic labor with a regression in 
cranial capacity. 
If, in contrast, domestic labor was associated with high pay, power and respect, 
then our discussion of it would be quite different. In order to illustrate this point, let’s 
deconstruct Noah’s statement above. Let’s assume an employee were to say to a boss 
when the boss complained about the employee’s performance in meeting some goal: 
I never asked the boss to achieve anything of those things. I can’t help it if the 
boss has higher standards than I do. I don’t care whether we meet those goals. I 
don’t care if the goals get met this week or next week. 
If an employee were to say this, she or he would likely be judged a lazy employee worth 
firing. Indeed, the boss would likely say, “You obviously can’t hack the business world, 
get out!” However, it seems from some of the responses by Clair and Wood that they, 
instead, would react by thinking, “Well, the boss is just an over-performer and needs to 
relax a little. If an employee doesn’t want to work as hard as the boss, then that’s just as 
much the boss’s problem as the employee’s.” At least in today’s world, such a reaction 
would not be seen as legitimate. And, just as underperformers at work are usually not 
allowed a free pass, we believe it makes sense to critically examine underperformance in 
the private sphere. 
This circles back to the fact that we believe the critiques of our theory are 
sidestepping an important premise of conflict about domestic labor—and that is that 
domestic labor when performed in one’s own home is not rewarded with material 
benefits. Therefore, until such time that domestic labor is valued in the same way as work 
in the public sphere, we believe it’s important to redress inequalities. Namely, when over-
performers (mostly women), regularly do the lion’s share of domestic labor, injustice 
ensues—and there’s good reason to develop a theory and an explanation that might 
attempt to rectify this injustice.  
Finally, we must respond to Wood’s critique of our less than sanguine view of the 
potential for change in how men and women are socialized regarding the performance of 
domestic labor. Of course, such change is what we hope for and believe is possible. 
However, though such change may seem inevitable and quick from an historical 
perspective, years and decades of waiting for it likely does not feel swift and is of little 
benefit to those individuals and marriages/relationships that are suffering from that lack 
of change in the here and now.  We believe that if dyads use our theory right now to 
understand and guide their divisions of domestic labor, such behaviors can help create 
social change. As children see more equitable divisions of labor and/or understand that 
threshold level (not biological sex) drives one’s performance of domestic labor, perhaps 
social change will occur that much more quickly. 
At this juncture, we are poised to move forward in assessing the claims our theory 
offers and to refine the theory on the basis of those assessments and the excellent 
critiques and feedback offered by Professors Caryn Medved, Robin Clair, Julia Wood and 
an anonymous reviewer.  We greatly appreciate your intellectual contributions and the 
considerable time and energy you have devoted to improving our project and our work 
yet to come. 
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